open method · version 0.1 draft · september 2026

The Shorward Rating Method

Five levels of post-quantum readiness, the evidence each level needs, and how we measure it. We publish the method so buyers can require "Shorward Q3 or equivalent" and vendors know exactly what it takes.

What the rating measures

The rating measures how far an organization has gone toward protecting its systems against a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. That is a machine able to run Shor's algorithm against RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. The rating covers the systems in an agreed scope, usually the products and services a vendor sells to its customers.

It is not a general security certification, a FIPS 140-3 validation, or a guarantee against breach. It says how ready the in-scope systems are for post-quantum cryptography, and it rests on evidence we have checked.

The five levels

Each level includes everything in the levels below it.

Q0UnknownNo current cryptographic inventory exists, or it is more than 90 days old.
Q1InventoriedEvidence required
  • A cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM) in CycloneDX 1.6 format, covering in-scope applications, services, certificates, keys, libraries and hardware security modules
  • Each entry lists the algorithm, key size, owner and the systems that depend on it
  • Automated discovery refreshed within the last 90 days
Q2PlannedEvidence required
  • Risk ranking of every quantum-vulnerable asset, using data shelf life and migration time (Mosca's inequality)
  • A migration roadmap with owners and target dates for every high-risk asset
  • A readiness status on file for each critical third-party dependency
  • A named executive owner for the migration
Q3Protected in transitEvidence required
  • All external TLS endpoints in scope negotiate a hybrid post-quantum key exchange, such as X25519MLKEM768, verified by our scan
  • VPN and partner connections carrying sensitive data use ML-KEM or a hybrid equivalent
  • Long-lived sensitive data is protected against harvest-now-decrypt-later collection
Q4Quantum-safeEvidence required
  • Code signing, firmware signing and issuing certificate authorities use ML-DSA or SLH-DSA, or dual-sign during transition
  • No in-scope RSA or elliptic-curve use remains, except documented exceptions with an end date
  • Critical vendors have verified post-quantum support

How a rating is measured

How the levels map to public guidance

LevelAligns with
Q1CISA, NSA and NIST quantum-readiness guidance (cryptographic inventory); UK NCSC discovery phase; US EO 14412 inventory requirement
Q2NIST IR 8547 transition timelines; EU coordinated PQC roadmap; ASD "questions to ask your vendors"
Q3FIPS 203 (ML-KEM); hybrid key exchange deployed by major browsers and cloud providers
Q4FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA); NSA CNSA 2.0 signing requirements

Changes and disputes

This is a draft. We will publish every revision with a version number and date, and give rated organizations 90 days' notice before a stricter requirement applies to them. If an organization disagrees with its level, it can upload further evidence and the rating is measured again.